The Blackout Plan Built on a Signal Nobody’s Guaranteed

A dead zone is just annoying. Until it’s the plan.

There are three towns on my regular 5 mile commute where the DAB signal in my car doesn’t fade — it just stops. No warning, no crackle, nothing. I’ve learned where they are and I’ve stopped being surprised by it. It’s a minor, ordinary irritation, the kind every driver in Britain has somewhere on their route.

It stopped feeling minor this week, when it emerged that the BBC has a full contingency plan for what it calls a “black sky” event: a total, prolonged failure of the national grid. And the backbone of that plan isn’t DAB. It’s FM.

What the plan actually involves

The scenario is electricity, water, payment systems and mobile networks failing at once, for days rather than hours. The BBC’s response is a dedicated emergency studio, run by around 100 staff, broadcasting pre-prepared government announcements on FM. The studio and transmission towers are disconnected from the internet and run on diesel generators, with fuel tanks sized to give roughly three days of power. Satellite phones are the fallback once mobile networks go down with everything else.

It’s a serious, carefully built plan. The scenario planners at the Cabinet Office, the National Energy System Operator and the BBC itself have clearly thought hard about what fails and in what order. What struck me wasn’t the plan. It was what the plan assumes it can rely on.

FM is guaranteed until “at least 2030” — and nothing beyond that

That phrase, “at least 2030”, comes from a 2021 government review, and it’s still the only firm commitment on the table. In February 2026, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport opened a new review into the future of radio distribution, explicitly considering a managed transition away from FM sometime in the 2030s. That review is due to report this autumn. As I’m writing this, it hasn’t yet — which means a decision capable of retiring the BBC’s entire emergency broadcast backbone could land within weeks.

I read through the government’s own reasoning for the review. It’s built entirely on listening habits and spectrum economics: around three-quarters of listening is now digital, there’s a knock-on question about what happens to Digital Terrestrial Television spectrum, and AI gets a passing mention as a factor reshaping how radio is made and consumed. Resilience and emergency broadcasting aren’t mentioned. Not once, in any of the published material setting out why this review exists.

Two plans, never tested against each other

So one part of government is building a continuity plan on the assumption that FM will still be there when everything else has failed. Another part of the same government is actively reviewing whether to switch it off, using criteria that never once ask “but what happens in a blackout?”

I don’t think that’s the BBC knowing something Ofcom doesn’t, or the reverse. I think it’s simpler and more familiar than that: two plans that were drawn up by different teams, on different timelines, answering different questions, that nobody has yet sat side by side and cross-checked. The resilience world owns the black sky plan. The media policy world owns the FM switch-off decision. As far as the published material shows, they haven’t had the conversation with each other.

This happens inside organisations constantly

If you work in business continuity or crisis management, this should feel uncomfortably familiar, because it’s the same failure mode we see on the inside of organisations all the time: a continuity plan leans on a piece of infrastructure, a system or a supplier that’s quietly being reviewed, descoped or decommissioned by a completely different part of the same business — and nobody checked whether the two decisions were talking to each other.

It’s not a hypothetical. The UK’s copper landline network is being switched off in January 2027. If any part of your plan still assumes a dial tone — an alarm line, a lift phone, an old EPOS terminal, a fallback number in an invocation procedure — that assumption has an expiry date, and it isn’t your decision to extend it. The same question applies to the cloud service your DR plan depends on, the supplier your BIA treats as a given, the piece of legacy software IT has quietly flagged for retirement next year. The plan can be perfectly well written and still fail, not because anyone did their job badly, but because the thing it depends on moved and nobody was watching that door.

The question worth asking this week

My dead zones were never going to kill anyone. But they’re a decent, concrete reminder that “the plan works” and “the thing the plan depends on still exists” are two separate questions, and answering the first one tells you nothing about the second.

So here’s a genuinely useful exercise for anyone running a BCP, a DR plan or a crisis framework right now: list every external assumption your plan quietly relies on — a network, a supplier, a piece of infrastructure, a regulatory position — and ask who, specifically, is responsible for noticing if that assumption changes. Not reviewing the plan once a year. Watching the thing underneath it, on an ongoing basis, whether or not anyone’s written a news story about it yet.

In my experience, the honest answer is “nobody” far more often than organisations would like to admit. If that’s your answer too, that’s not a criticism — it’s just the gap the next incident will find first.

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Helen Molyneux, founder of Cambridge Risk Solutions, ISO 22301 and ISO 27001 Lead Auditor

Helen Molyneux is the founder and director of Cambridge Risk Solutions. A certified Lead Auditor for ISO 22301 and ISO 27001, she has spent nearly two decades helping organisations across the public and private sectors build genuine resilience — not just documented compliance. She writes from practice, not theory.

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